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BEWARE THE TRADEMARK ECHO CHAMBER:  
WHY FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD NOT  
DEFER TO USPTO DECISIONS 
Deborah R. Gerhardt† 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explains why federal courts should not defer to United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) trademark decisions. Under United States trademark law, actual 
use of a mark on specific goods or services is required to support federal trademark 
registration. The USPTO processes a tremendous volume of applications to register 
trademarks. In order to do so expeditiously, trademark examiners use heuristics drawn from 
past USPTO registration data. While markets continually change, each trademark registration 
is updated at five or ten-year renewal intervals. Accordingly, much of the data does not reflect 
current market use. A recent audit established that many federal trademark registrations would 
be cancelled if their factual foundations were challenged. In stark contrast, courts examine 
market evidence in evaluating the core trademark issues of use, validity, and availability. 
Examining the factual context of each mark is especially important because, unlike other forms 
of intellectual property, trademarks have no fixed duration. They are functions of market use. 
Over time, trademark rights may shrink, be forfeited or expand and last indefinitely as use and 
public perceptions change. If courts apply de novo review to Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board (TTAB) decisions, they will ensure that a forum remains for trademark decisions to be 
adjudicated based on facts, instead of shortcuts, and current, not past, understandings. While 
the USPTO does have significant trademark expertise, it does not have the authority to 
consider Constitutional limits on trademark protection. As seen in the administrative history 
of the “SLANTS” mark, the USPTO does not adjudicate whether trademark registration 
decisions violate constitutional rights. Too much deference to the USPTO could result in a 
trademark echo chamber where litigants never have the opportunity for a court to examine 
the entire factual record or consider how trademark decisions impact expressive speech. For 
all of these reasons, federal courts should review USPTO trademark decisions de novo to 
preserve the opportunity for adjudication based on genuine fact-finding and an openness to 
modes of inquiry in addition to trademark law. 
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I.? INTRODUCTION 
Federal judges may be tempted to defer to administrative findings on 
trademark matters. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
employs hundreds of lawyers who spend all their professional time on 
trademark law and policy. Their expertise on trademark matters is substantial, 
and at first glance, it may seem to be reason enough to defer to their decisions. 
A prominent scholar asserted that administrative law doctrine supports giving 
USPTO decisions greater deference than they are currently accorded.1 But 
before doing so, there are important counterarguments to consider.  
This Article identifies four reasons why federal courts should be 
particularly cautious about deferring to USPTO trademark decisions. First, 
administrative law supports de novo review. Second, the USPTO routinely 
uses heuristics drawn from the Principal Register in place of evidence of actual 
market use. Before deferring to a USPTO decision in any particular matter, 
?
 1. See generally Melissa F. Wasserman, What Administrative Law Can Teach the Trademark 
System, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1511 (2016). 
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federal courts should consider whether the USPTO examined evidence of 
market use before rendering their decision. Third, trademark rights can change 
dramatically over time. Most forms of intellectual property, like patents, 
copyrights, and rights of publicity, have set linear terms of protection and then 
move into the public domain. Trademarks are different. They can move in and 
out of protectable status as market uses and language evolve. A trademark, if 
carefully curated as a source identifying symbol, can last forever. But it is also 
possible for a mark owner to lose trademark rights at any time if the mark is 
abandoned or ceases to signal commercial distinctiveness. Fourth, while the 
USPTO has significant trademark experience, it lacks expertise on other issues, 
such as market analysis, lexicography, economics, and First Amendment 
expressive rights, which are often implicated in trademark matters.  
This Article proceeds in five parts. After summarizing the trademark 
registration process in Part II, the discussion proceeds through the four 
reasons why federal courts should apply de novo review to USPTO decisions. 
Part III challenges the assertion that administrative law supports greater 
deference to USPTO decisions. It sets forth multiple ways in which 
administrative law doctrine supports de novo review of USPTO decisions. Part 
IV identifies the heuristics that the USPTO uses in place of market evidence 
to examine the fundamental questions of trademark use, distinctiveness, and 
likelihood of confusion. All of these issues raise fact-intensive questions that 
the USPTO lacks the time and resources to address. The USPTO processes a 
tremendous volume of applications. In order to do so expeditiously, trademark 
examiners are instructed to use evidentiary heuristics in place of actual facts. 
These heuristics may lead to overprotection of some marks resulting in 
underprotection for new entrants engaged in bona fide use. These results may 
then be affirmed without genuine fact-finding by the USPTO’s administrative 
court, known as the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).  
Part V explains how trademark protection is fundamentally different from 
other forms of intellectual property that may be lost due to expiration or 
disclosure. While trademark rights can be lost as well, they can also expand or 
contract over time as use and public perception change. The dynamic nature 
of trademarks and the forward-looking nature of the likelihood of confusion 
standard mean that the doctrine has built-in flexibility meant to permit 
reconsideration of past predictive conclusions. This flexibility provides 
additional room for courts to avoid deference to past administrative decisions 
and, instead, to conduct independent de novo review. 
Finally, Part VI analyzes whether the USPTO’s significant trademark 
expertise justifies deference. While the USPTO has extensive expertise in 
trademark law, it lacks expertise in other disciplines that protect expressive 
interests and inform how consumers perceive symbols. Too much deference 
could result in decisions from a trademark echo chamber. Federal court 
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intervention may be necessary to protect expressive interests that are often 
entwined in trademark matters. The Federal Circuit and Supreme Court 
decisions overturning the TTAB’s refusal to register “THE SLANTS” mark 
illustrate the important role that federal courts play in assuring that trademark 
issues are not extinguished by decision-makers who lack authority to consider 
First Amendment rights.2 For all of the foregoing reasons, Part VII concludes 
that as currently constructed, the practice of de novo federal court review 
ensures that there is a forum for trademark decisions to be made based on 
genuine fact-finding and an openness to modes of inquiry outside of trademark 
law. 
II.? THE USPTO’S TRADEMARK REGISTRATION SYSTEM 
The Trademark division of the USPTO reviews applications for federal 
trademark protection.3 Successful applicants are granted federal registration. 
The USPTO administers two official trademark registries: the Principal and 
Supplemental Registers. The Principal Register confers superior statutory 
benefits.4 A principal registration gives the mark owner exclusive nationwide 
rights to use the mark on the goods and services identified in the application.5 
Even if a brand owner is not using its mark in every state, the registration 
empowers the owner to stop later adopters from using the mark once the 
owner enters their regions.6 The registration certificate constitutes prima facie 
evidence that the mark is valid and owned by the applicant.7 After a mark is 
on the Principal Register for five years, it may become “incontestable” if its 
owner indicates it is still in use on the identified goods and services.8 Once 
incontestable status is secured, the registration may be renewed indefinitely 
?
 2.  See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (affirming the Federal Circuit’s en 
banc reversal of the TTAB decision denying registration of “THE SLANTS” because the 
statute barring registration of disparaging marks violated the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution). 
 3.  For a more detailed description of the trademark registration process, see generally 
Deborah R. Gerhardt & Jon P. McClanahan, Do Trademark Lawyers Matter?, 16 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 583 (2013). 
 4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1094 (2012). 
 5. See id. § 1057(c) (“[T]he filing of the application to register such mark shall constitute 
constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect, on or in 
connection with the goods or services specified in the registration against any other 
person . . . .”). 
 6. See generally Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959) 
(holding that “§ 1072 affords nationwide protection to registered marks, regardless of the area 
in which the registrant actually uses the mark”). 
 7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). 
 8. Id. § 1065. 
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every ten years. 9  An incontestable registration constitutes “conclusive 
evidence” of the mark’s validity and the information in the registration 
certificate. 10  Incontestable status does not prevent the mark from being 
challenged, but it limits the grounds on which a cancellation claim may be 
asserted.11  
When seeking to register a trademark, an applicant must demonstrate that 
the mark is used in commerce, is commercially distinctive of goods and 
services, and is not barred by statute. Applicants must verify, under oath, the 
date when they began using the mark in commerce and the goods or services 
used in connection with the mark.12 Applicants must also provide at least one 
specimen that shows the use of the mark in commerce.13  
Proof of distinctiveness is another threshold requirement.14 A mark will be 
found distinctive if it signals to consumers that the product or service 
originates from a particular source. The Supreme Court stated that, “[a]n 
identifying mark is distinctive and capable of being protected if it either (1) is 
inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary 
meaning.”15 A mark may be placed on the less desirable Supplemental Register 
if it is not yet distinctive but is capable of acquiring commercially distinctive 
meaning. 16  When, for example, an applicant cannot establish that its 
descriptive phrase has earned consumer recognition as a mark, it may still 
obtain a place on the Supplemental Register.17 If the phrase ever acquires 
distinctiveness, also known as “secondary meaning,” the applicant may reapply 
for acceptance on the Principal Register.18  
Even if a mark is used in a way that it is distinctive, the USPTO will not 
register the mark if it is barred by Section 2 of the Lanham Act, the federal 
statute governing trademark law. The USPTO “must register source-
identifying trademarks unless the mark falls into one of several categories of 
marks precluded from registration.”19 Section 2 lists bars to registration.20 For 
?
 9. See id. § 1058. 
 10. Id. § 1115. 
 11. Id. §§ 1064(3), 1065. 
 12. See id. § 1051. Applications based on a bona fide intent to use a mark must provide 
proof of use before the mark will be registered.  
 13. See id. 
 14. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 11:70 (5th ed. 2018). 
 15. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (emphasis in original). 
 16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1091. 
 17. See id. § 1095. 
 18. See id.  
 19. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), aff’d sub 
nom. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)–(e). 
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example, Section 2(a) prohibits registration of words that are deceptive. Under 
this provision, the TTAB denied an application to register “MARC 
CHAGALL” for vodka because it falsely suggested a connection to the famous 
painter.21 More typically, applications are denied based on Section 2(d) which 
bars the registration of a new mark if it is confusingly similar to one already on 
the Principal Register. 
A USPTO attorney reviews each trademark application. If the application 
is defective in any way, the examining attorney may issue an office action 
specifying the problem. Most applicants must overcome at least one office 
action before a mark will be successfully registered.22 Within six months of the 
date on which the office action is issued, the applicant must respond by 
amending the application or submitting evidence and arguments rebutting the 
examiner’s concerns. 23  When all such issues are resolved, the examining 
attorney will approve the application, and the mark will be published in the 
USPTO’s Official Gazette.24 Publication indicates that all USPTO objections 
have been overcome, but it opens a second window of vulnerability. After 
publication, third parties who think they may be harmed by the registration 
have thirty days to file an opposition proceeding.25 Oppositions are adjudicated 
by the USPTO’s TTAB. If no opposition is filed, the application will be 
admitted to the Principal Register.26  
All registered marks (and applications) are published and easily found by 
an Internet search in the USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Search System 
(TESS) database. In the examination process, the USPTO examiners search 
TESS to see whether an applicant’s mark may lead to confusion with a mark 
that is already registered. Trademark examiners are very adept at finding 
confusing similarities and will not admit new marks for registration if they are 
likely to cause confusion with marks registered earlier. A recent empirical study 
documents that refusals based on a likelihood of confusion are occurring with 
greater frequency. 27  In this way, the USPTO is becoming an increasingly 
important partner in policing the boundaries of registered trademarks. Live 
registrations also provide their owners with meaningful deterrent value. New 
?
 21. See generally Ass’n pour la Defense et la Promotion de L’oeuvre de Marc Chagall Dite 
Comite Marc Chagall v. Bondarchuk, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1838 (T.T.A.B. 2007). 
 22. See Gerhardt & McClanahan, supra note 3, at 615. 
 23. 37 C.F.R. § 2.62 (2015). 
 24. See Gerhardt & McClanahan, supra note 3, at 590. 
 25. See 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (2012). 
 26. If the mark has not yet been used in commerce, the applicant will receive a “Notice 
of Allowance” and registration will occur after the applicant demonstrates that it has begun 
using the mark in commerce. 
 27. See Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An 
Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 1003–12 (2018). 
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entrants familiar with the USPTO registration process search the registries 
before selecting marks because they know the USPTO may deny registration 
based on section 2(d) if an applicant puts forward a mark that may be deemed 
similar to one that is already registered.  
Applicants whose marks are refused registration may appeal to the 
TTAB.28 These appeals are generally conducted through written testimony and 
arguments, but parties may request a live oral argument.29 TTAB decisions may 
be appealed directly to the Federal Circuit or any federal district court with 
jurisdiction over the dispute.30 In litigation, federal judges may also review 
TTAB registration decisions made by examiners. Once a federal court is asked 
to review a USPTO trademark decision, the judiciary must identify the 
appropriate standard for reviewing the administrative trademark decision. The 
next Section sets forth important considerations for determining the 
appropriate standard of review. 
III.? ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT JUDICIAL 
DEFERENCE TO USPTO TRADEMARK DECISIONS 
When a federal court defers to an administrative agency’s decision, it 
adopts a decision that it may not have made independently.31 Professor Melissa 
Wasserman has written an excellent article that sets forth reasons why federal 
courts should review USPTO decisions with greater deference.32 The goal of 
this Article is to provide a counterbalance. It is meant to be read alongside 
hers, and therefore, any arguments that may support greater deference are not 
rearticulated. Instead, this Article sets forth the reasons courts should not defer 
?
 28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1070. 
 29. TBMP 702.03 (2018) (“Because the Board is an administrative tribunal, its rules and 
procedures differ in some respects from those prevailing in the federal district courts . . . . For 
example, in lieu of live testimony, proceedings before the Board are conducted in writing, and 
the Board’s actions in a particular case are based on the written record therein. The Board 
does not preside at the taking of testimony. Rather, all testimony is taken out of the presence 
of the Board, by affidavit or declaration, or on oral examination or written questions, and the 
affidavits, declarations and written deposition transcripts, together with any exhibits thereto, 
are then submitted to the Board.”); id. at 802.02 (permitting either party to a proceeding to 
request an oral hearing). 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 1071. 
 31. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and 
Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 665 (2000) (“Judicial deference 
acknowledges that . . . a court might arrive at a conclusion different from one it would 
otherwise reach.”); Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 643, 652 (2015) (defining deference “to include any situation in which a second 
decisionmaker is influenced by the judgment of some initial decisionmaker rather than 
examining an issue entirely de novo”). 
 32. See generally Wasserman, supra note 1.   
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to USPTO trademark decisions. 
Federal courts have not reached a consensus on the standard of review 
they should apply to USPTO trademark decisions. 33  Occasionally, federal 
courts have concluded it is appropriate to defer to the USPTO’s trademark 
expertise on interpretations of the Lanham Act.34 More often, the federal 
judiciary accords less deference, reviewing the decisions as “persuasive, but not 
controlling” or “entitled to respect” due to the USPTO’s trademark 
expertise.35 Many other courts apply no deference at all and review USPTO 
decisions independently under a de novo standard.36  
Given the substantial trademark experience at the USPTO, federal courts 
may be tempted to defer to agency expertise. Before doing so, they should 
note that administrative law doctrine provides a sound basis for declining to 
exercise such deference. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) sets default 
rules to unify federal agency procedures and the extent to which federal courts 
may review agency decisions.37 Unless Congress enacts legislation specifying 
the appropriate standard of review for an agency’s decisions, the APA dictates 
the standard of review that federal courts should apply.38 The federal patent 
statutes do not specify the standard of review that courts should apply when 
reviewing USPTO decisions. In Dickensen v. Zurko, the Supreme Court clarified 
that the APA sets the standards of review for judicial consideration of USPTO 
patent decisions.39  
  
?
 33. See id. at 1556–57. 
 34. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994 F.2d 
1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 35. See, e.g., Kelly Services, Inc. v. Creative Harbor, LLC, 846 F.3d 857, 879 n.1 (6th Cir. 
2017) (citing Rosenruist-Gestao E Servicios LDA v. Virgin Enters. Ltd., 511 F.3d 437, 459–
60 (4th Cir. 2007); Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 382 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(citing TTAB decisions); Enrique Bernat F., S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F.3d 439, 443 (5th 
Cir. 2000); Gruma Corp. v. Mex. Restaurants, Inc., 497 F. App’x. 392, 396 n.1 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(collecting cases treating TTAB decisions as persuasive authority). 
 36. See, e.g., Aktieselskabet AF November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 13 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining that a district court “decides de novo whether the application at 
issue should proceed to registration, or the registration involved should be canceled, or 
“such other matter as the issues in the proceeding require, as the facts in the case may 
appear”); Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC, 739 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding 
that “the district court reviews the record de novo and acts as the finder of fact”); Pro-
Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 452 (E.D. Va. 2015), vacated on other 
grounds, 709 F. App’x 182 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Where a party to such an action exercises its 
right to supplement the TTAB record, the Court gives no deference to 
the TTAB’s findings.”). 
 37. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012). 
 38. Dickensen v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999). 
 39. Id. 
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Like federal patent law, the Lanham Act contains no provision specifying 
the standard of review for USPTO trademark decisions.40 Following Dickenson, 
one would expect the APA to govern the level of deference federal courts 
should afford to USPTO trademark decisions.41 The APA sets forth three 
standards federal courts may use in reviewing administrative decisions on 
questions of law: the “must defer” Chevron standard, the “may defer” Skidmore 
review, or the “no deference” standard of de novo review.42 Under the Chevron 
standard, courts must defer to reasonable agency decisions, especially when 
the agency has particular expertise over a “regulatory scheme [that is] technical 
and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned 
fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”43 Under the 
Skidmore standard, although agency decisions are not controlling, courts may 
defer to agency expertise because their decisions “constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment.”44 When Chevron deference applies, the 
reviewing court substitutes the agency’s findings for its own, and when 
Skidmore deference applies, the court may lean heavily on the agency’s 
interpretation. In stark contrast, courts that apply de novo review make 
independent findings of fact and conclusions of law.45  
Professor Melissa Wasserman asserts that Chevron deference should be 
given to USPTO decisions on questions of trademark law.46 Notwithstanding 
this general assertion and the normative hopes for a future USPTO with 
greater resources and evolved expertise, her central claim with respect to 
deference is narrow. Initial registration decisions constitute the vast majority 
?
 40. See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1527–29.   
 41. Dickensen, 527 U.S. at 152. 
 42. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1529. 
 43. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44, 865 (1984) (holding that 
“[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of 
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such 
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a 
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its 
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency”). 
 44. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 45. Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC, 739 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding 
that federal district courts have “authority independent of the PTO to grant or cancel 
registrations and to decide any related matters such as infringement and unfair competition 
claims.” 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1). The district court must admit the PTO record if a party so 
moves, and if admitted, the record “shall have the same effect as if originally taken and 
produced in the suit.” Id. at § 1071(b)(3). Whether or not the record is admitted, the parties 
have an unrestricted right to submit further evidence as long as it is admissible under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure.). 
 46. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1539. 
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of the USPTO’s trademark work. Professor Wasserman concedes that federal 
courts should afford no deference to registration decisions made by trademark 
examiners.47 However, in her judgment, a subset of registration appeals do 
warrant deference. She asserts that the best candidates are the subset of 
decisions that the TTAB expressly designates as precedential. 48  Some 
precedential decisions are appealed to the Federal Circuit, and Professor 
Wasserman concludes that Skidmore deference, or more provocatively Chevron 
deference, should be applied.49 She concedes that if the applicant chose to 
instead appeal the decision to a federal district court, deference would not be 
appropriate because “[i]f new evidence is presented that informs the 
underlying legal determination, then the district court should make de novo 
factual findings and legal determinations. In this circumstance, the district court 
is not acting as a reviewing court, as envisioned by the APA, but instead as a 
tribunal of first impression.”50  
Notwithstanding Wasserman’s arguments in favor of deference for 
precedential TTAB decisions appealed to the Federal Circuit, administrative 
law doctrine provides reasons not to apply Chevron or Skidmore deference to 
any USPTO trademark decisions. The deferential Chevron standard requires 
federal courts to defer to agency interpretations on ambiguous questions of 
law that are based on a “reasonable” construction of the statute.51 In United 
States v. Mead, the Supreme Court clarified that Chevron deference should be 
applied only if Congress delegated formal rule-making power or formal 
adjudication authority to the agency.52 The USPTO possesses neither of the 
two formal powers that trigger Chevron deference. 
The USPTO does not have formal rule-making authority. In the patent 
context, the Federal Circuit held that the USPTO may enact only procedural 
rules and does not have the substantive rule-making authority required to 
?
 47. See id. at 1526. 
 48. Id. at 1539. Only decisions that TTAB identified as “precedential” are considered 
binding on the board. All other decisions may be considered as persuasive authority but are 
not binding. TBMP § 101.03 (June 2017) (clarifying that TTAB decisions are citable as 
precedent only if they are “designated by the Board ‘citable as precedent,’ ‘precedent of the 
Board,’ ‘precedent of the TTAB,’ or ‘for publication in full’ . . . . Decisions which are not so 
designated, or which are designated for publication only in digest form, are not binding on the 
Board, but may be cited for whatever persuasive weight to which they may be entitled. 
Decisions of other tribunals may be cited to the extent allowed and for the purposes permitted 
by the tribunal that issued the decision”). 
 49. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1547.  
 50. Id. at 1545. 
 51. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 52. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
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trigger Chevron deference.53 Similarly, the trademark side of the USPTO has 
only procedural authority.54 Professor Wasserman concedes that the USPTO 
“does not possess the power to issue binding rules that carry the force of law 
on the core issues of trademark law.”55  
Even without formal rule-making authority, Chevron deference may be 
appropriate when agencies are given formal adjudication authority. 56 
Adjudications “involve determinations of contested facts in applying rules to 
specific circumstances.”57 By definition, adjudications require examination of 
contested facts. Therefore, it is important to examine whether the USPTO 
trademark registration process involves genuine fact-finding. As set forth in 
Part IV, the USPTO uses a series of administrative shortcuts in place of market 
evidence in making trademark registration decisions. Given these routine 
practices, it would be inaccurate to describe the USPTO’s trademark 
registration process as formal adjudication.  
Congress knows how to assign final adjudication authority to agencies so 
that the agency’s decisions will be accorded Chevron deference. Typically, when 
Congress decides to give an agency formal adjudication authority, it says so by 
expressly using words such as “on the record” to clarify that the agency’s 
proceedings involve the type of fact finding one would experience in court.58 
Professor Wasserman concedes that the typical words Congress uses to grant 
formal adjudicatory authority do not appear in the Lanham Act.59 That absence 
makes sense because Congress explicitly provided for trademark registration 
decisions to be fully litigated in federal district court.60  
  
?
 53. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Because Congress 
has not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive rulemaking power . . . the rule 
of controlling deference set forth in Chevron does not apply” to most PTO regulations, which 
are procedural in nature). 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (2012) (“The Director shall make rules and regulations, not 
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office under this 
chapter.”) (emphasis added). 
 55. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1534.  
 56. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226–27. 
 57. See United States v. Indep. Bulk Transp., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 474, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(citing United States v. Florida E. C. R. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244-45 (1973); Int’l Tel. & Tel. 
Corp. v. Local 134, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 419 U.S. 428 (1975)). 
 58. Melissa M. Berry, Beyond Chevron’s Domain: Agency Interpretations of Statutory Procedural 
Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 541, 551–52 (2007) (explaining that although the Supreme 
Court never had a bright-lined rule, “no one would dispute that formal procedures should be 
required if the enabling statute includes ‘on the record’ language . . . many states require some 
sort of ‘hearing’ . . .”). 
 59. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1537. 
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) (2012). 
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The APA provides that de novo review is appropriate when there is a 
statutory guarantee of a new trial.61 It states that the reviewing court shall 
decide all questions of law and set aside any agency findings of facts when “the 
facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.”62 This is exactly the 
scenario that the Lanham Act created so that all examination and TTAB 
decisions may be fully relitigated in federal district court.63 
Commentators and courts agree that when new evidence is presented in 
federal district court, the TTAB’s findings of fact must be reviewed de novo.64 
When no new evidence is offered, federal courts have debated the appropriate 
standard for reviewing USPTO’s findings of fact. Some courts state that they 
defer to facts found by the USPTO if they are supported by “substantial 
evidence.”65 Professor Wasserman argues that the more deferential “arbitrary 
or capricious” standard should be applied when a TTAB decision is appealed 
to the Federal Circuit or when no new facts are before a federal district court.66 
Under this standard, the reviewing court may not substitute its view for that 
of the agency’s and may overturn an agency’s findings of fact only if the agency 
committed clear error in applying the relevant factors.67 Some have argued that 
the two standards have no meaningful difference.68  Others assert that no 
deference is appropriate beyond acknowledging the prima facie validity of the 
facts in a registration certificate. Some courts take a hybrid approach, using the 
“substantial evidence” standard unless the mark owner asserts new evidence, 
at which point the standard becomes de novo.69 The Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held: 
In none of these provisions conferring on federal courts the power 
to adjudicate rights under the Lanham Act does Congress instruct 
?
 61. Id. § 706(2)(f). 
 62. Id.  
 63. See id. § 1071. 
 64. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1545 (“If new evidence is presented that informs 
the underlying legal determination, then the district court should make de novo factual 
findings and legal determinations.”); Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1700 (2012). 
 65. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(e) (2012); Am. Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 817 
(4th Cir. 2001).  
 66. See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1558. 
 67. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
 68. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1550, n.178 (citing, inter alia, then-Judge Scalia’s opinion 
in Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 
F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 69. See Pro-Football, Inc., v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 102 (2003) (“[T]he Court reviews 
the findings of fact of the TTAB under the substantial evidence test, which has been derived 
from the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706. Additionally, the parties are 
permitted to offer new evidence, and the Court may make new findings of fact based on this 
newly submitted evidence.”). 
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the courts to review registration decisions of the PTO under a 
deferential standard. To the contrary, Congress “has directly 
spoken” on this issue, specifying a more limited standard: the agency 
action is “prima facie evidence” of specified facts, and no more.70  
It is this last view that makes the most sense, given the USPTO’s limited 
ability to engage in fact-finding. De novo review of TTAB decisions in federal 
court was expressly put into the Lanham Act to assure that trademark litigants 
would have a forum to present all operative facts. A leading administrative law 
treatise confirms that de novo review is the appropriate standard when “fact 
finding is essential and the agency has inadequate procedures for fact 
finding.”71   
De novo review of USPTO trademark decision-making is necessary to 
provide an opportunity for genuine fact-finding. In Kappos v. Hyatt, the 
Supreme Court unanimously held that when a patent litigant appeals a USPTO 
decision to a federal district court, they are entitled to “a de novo 
determination with respect to any issue of fact.”72 The Court explained that 
“where new evidence is presented to the district court on a disputed fact 
question, a de novo finding will be necessary to take such evidence into 
account together with the evidence before the board.”73 Although the Kappos 
decision addressed questions of patent law, the Supreme Court’s clarification 
on the standard of review to accord USPTO patent decisions should apply to 
the agency’s trademark decisions as well. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly applied the Kappos 
reasoning to a USPTO trademark decision, stating that when new evidence is 
submitted, de novo review is required because the district court “cannot 
meaningfully defer to the PTO’s factual findings if the PTO considered a 
different set of facts.” 74  The major issues of use, distinctiveness, and 
availability that the USPTO decides for purposes of registration are all fact-
intensive.75 As set forth in Part IV, the USPTO uses a host of administrative 
rules of thumb in place of actual market evidence to make these factual 
determinations. Federal district court provides a genuine forum for a full 
factual review of the record not replicated by the USPTO. In order to assure 
that the trademark litigants have some opportunity to present all operative 
?
 70. Am. Online, Inc., 243 F.3d at 817. 
 71. See KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 11.4 (5th ed., 2018 Cum. Supp. 2010).  
 72. See id.  § 15.2. 
 73. Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1700 (2012). 
 74.  Swatch AG v. Beehive Warehouse, LLC, 739 F.3d 150, 156 (2014) (citing Kappos, 132 
S. Ct. at 1700). 
 75. See id. at 155 (discussing likelihood of dilution and likelihood of confusion as fact-
intensive). 
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facts, courts should not defer to factual determinations made by the USPTO.  
Policy concerns about inefficiency raise additional questions about 
whether deference is advisable, even if it is not required. The Lanham Act does 
not require trademark owners to exhaust administrative remedies before 
litigating trademark validity or infringement questions in court.76 Congress also 
did not provide the USPTO with primary jurisdiction over trademark 
registrations. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction “is concerned with 
promoting the proper relationships between the courts and administrative 
agencies charged with particular regulatory duties.”77 The doctrine provides 
that federal courts should suspend proceedings “whenever enforcement of the 
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have 
been placed within the special competence of an administrative body.” 78 
Congress expressly provided that either the TTAB or the courts could consider 
trademark registration issues; therefore, neither has primary jurisdiction.79 To 
the extent the questions overlap, either proceeding may be delayed pending a 
resolution of the other.80  
A federal court has the discretion to stay its proceedings pending USPTO 
review. A stay is most appropriate when only registration issues are before the 
federal court.81 In the interest of judicial economy, “the case for permitting the 
PTO to proceed first is bolstered where the PTO adjudication might serve as 
a final disposition of the matter, making further trial court proceedings 
unnecessary.”82 When courts hear trademark cases that involve more than  
registration decisions, the argument for deferring to the USPTO is less 
compelling.83 Given the robust fact-finding abilities of courts and the broader 
issues often presented in trademark litigation, courts may find that “it is 
?
 76. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) (2012); Rhoades v. Avon Prod., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (“Congress has not installed the PTO as the exclusive expert in the field. As noted, 
parties may litigate these issues in federal court without previously exhausting their claims 
before the TTAB.”). 
 77. United States v. W. Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956). 
 77. Id. at 64. 
 79. Am. Bakeries Co. v. Pan-O-Gold Co., 650 F. Supp. 563, 565–68 (D. Minn. 1986). 
 80. See Rhoades, 504 F.3d at 1163–64 (refusing to stay litigation pending registration 
proceedings); Calista Enters. Ltd. v. Tenza Trading Ltd., 2013 WL 6080184 (denying motion 
to stay); Hanginout, Inc. v. Google, No.13cv2811 AJB (NLS), 2015 WL 11254689 (S.D. Cal. 
June 2, 2015) (denying motion to stay); Vina Casa Tamaya S.A. v. Oakville Hills Cellar, Inc., 
784 F. Supp. 2d 391, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting motion to dismiss because the “dispute 
can properly be resolved in the TTAB proceeding already underway”). 
 81. Rhoades, 504 F.3d at 1164. 
 82. Am. Bakeries, 650 F. Supp. at 567 (citing Driving Force, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., 498 
F. Supp. 21, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Kemin Indus., Inc. v. Watkins Prods., Inc., 183 U.S.P.Q. 799 
(D. Minn. 1974)).  
 83. Rhoades, 504 F.3d at 1164. 
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preferable for the TTAB to stay its own proceedings where parallel litigation 
occurs in the district court.”84 Decades of such precedent have led litigants and 
TTAB judges to rely on the possibility that questions of fact and law may be 
relitigated in federal court if the parties are dissatisfied with the results before 
the TTAB.85  
The Supreme Court’s recent consideration of issue preclusion in B & B 
Hardware v. Hargis Industries is consistent with maintaining de novo review.86 
The story of the case illustrates the anti-competitive effects that can result from 
deferring to administrative heuristics. Because it left unchallenged an 
administrative decision, Hargis ended up being stuck with a loss that conflicted 
with two wins it had litigated in federal court. The story of how that happened 
began in 1993, when B&B registered “SEALTIGHT” for fasteners used in the 
aerospace industry.87 The previous year, Hargis began using “SEALTITE” for 
screws used in the construction industry.88 The companies’ products did not 
compete. Nonetheless, B&B sued Hargis for trademark infringement.89 Hargis 
responded by petitioning the USPTO to cancel B&B’s registration, but that 
proceeding was stayed pending resolution of the litigation in federal court.90  
At trial, Hargis proved that B&B’s mark was descriptive without secondary 
meaning, and therefore, not sufficiently distinctive to merit federal trademark 
registration.91 Based on the verdict, Hargis should have obtained a judgment 
cancelling B&B’s federal registration. “[N]either the district court, nor the 
court of appeals that affirmed the ruling, ordered the PTO to cancel the 
?
 84. Sonora Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal S.A., 631 F. Supp. 626, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing 
The Other Tel. Co. v. Connecticut Nat’l Tel. Co., 181 U.S.P.Q. 779, 782 (Com’r 
1974)), aff’d, 795 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.1986); Am. Bakeries Co., 650 F. Supp. at 568 (denying 
motion to stay litigation pending the USPTO proceedings). 
85.  See, e.g., Swatch AG v. Beehive LLC, 739 F.3d 150 (after the TTAB found that 
“SWAP” for watch parts did not infringe “SWATCH” for watches, the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed that although “the TTAB applies a different standard for actual confusion, the 
district court properly found on a de novo review of the record” that no infringement or 
dilution liability was substantiated by the record); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 709 F. 
App’x 182, 183 (4th Cir. 2018) (directing the district court to reconsider its affirmance of the 
TTAB’s ordered cancellation of the “REDSKINS” registrations based on 1052(a)); Specialty 
Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distribs., 748 F.2d 669, 671 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (reversing the 
TTAB’s decision finding no likelihood of confusion between “SPICE ISLANDS” and 
“SPICE VALLEY” marks for tea). 
 86. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). 
 87. Id. at 1301. 
 88. SEALTITE, Registration No. 1,797,509 (no longer registered). 
 89. B&B Hardware, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1301. 
 90. Id. at 1302. 
 91. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 388 (8th Cir. 2009). 
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registration, despite that registration’s invalidity.”92  
After the trial, the TTAB lifted the stay on the cancellation proceeding, 
and Hargis sought to amend its claim to assert that B&B’s mark lacked 
distinctiveness based on the trial court’s finding that the mark was descriptive 
without secondary meaning.93 The motion was denied because, by then, B&B’s 
mark had been sitting on the Principal Register long enough to become 
incontestable, and therefore, the TTAB concluded that it could no longer be 
challenged as merely descriptive.94 
Hargis then applied to register “SEALTITE” for use with fasteners in the 
construction industry.95 The TTAB found that “SEALTITE” might lead to 
confusion with B&B’s registered mark and refused to register Hargis’s mark.96 
Hargis did not appeal this decision. While the registration challenges were 
pending before the USPTO, B&B sued Hargis again for infringement, and 
again, Hargis won on the merits. This time, the district court found that 
Hargis’s mark was not confusingly similar.97 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
held that Hargis’s failure to appeal the TTAB decision resulted in issue 
preclusion because “the usages adjudicated by the TTAB are materially the 
same as those before the district court.”98 
The Supreme Court was careful to cabin its holding to situations in which 
there was identical evidence and legal interpretation. The result could have 
been easily avoided if Hargis had secured cancellation of the B&B mark in the 
first round of litigation, or if Hargis had appealed the TTAB decision instead 
of assuming it could not have preclusive effect. The Supreme Court expressly 
stated that the Hargis saga was not the norm, and that the holding should not 
apply when the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are absent.99 The Court 
explained:  
Although many registrations will not satisfy those ordinary elements, 
that does not mean that none will. We agree with Professor 
McCarthy that issue preclusion applies where “the issues in the two 
cases are indeed identical and the other rules of collateral estoppel 
?
 92. Rebecca Tushnet, Fixing Incontestability: The Next Frontier, 43 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
434, 441 (2017). 
 93. Sealtite Building Fasteners v. B&B Hardware, Inc., No. 92026016 (T.T.A.B. June 13, 
2003). 
 94. SEALTITE, Registration No. 1,797,509 (no longer registered). 
 95. B&B Hardware, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1301. 
 96. Id. at 1302. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 1310. 
 99. Id. at 1306. 
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are carefully observed.100  
Justice Ginsburg joined the majority opinion and wrote a four-sentence 
concurrence to emphasize that TTAB decisions should not have preclusive 
effect when they rely on unsubstantiated claims in the Principal Register and 
not evidence of market use.101 Justice Ginsburg wrote, 
The Court rightly recognizes that “for a great many registration 
decisions issue preclusion obviously will not apply.” That is so 
because contested registrations are often decided upon “a 
comparison of the marks in the abstract and apart from their 
marketplace usage.” When the registration proceeding is of that 
character, “there will be no preclusion of the likelihood of confusion 
issue . . . in a later infringement suit.” On that understanding, I join 
the Court’s opinion.102 
The Supreme Court’s discussion in Hargis suggests multiple reasons why it 
would not affirm heightened deference to TTAB decisions. In deciding Hargis, 
the Supreme Court expressly mentioned the de novo standard, explaining that 
the “importance of registration is undoubtedly why Congress provided for de 
novo review of TTAB decisions in district court.”103 The majority also made it 
clear that when the Principal Register does not match actual market use, issue 
preclusion should not apply.104 The Court applied issue preclusion in Hargis 
after finding that the market uses were “materially the same” as those set forth 
in the Principal Register, but it cautioned that such a result would be 
inappropriate where the market and Register did not match.105 The Court 
noted that “if a mark owner uses its mark in ways that are materially unlike the 
usages in its application, then the TTAB is not deciding the same issue.”106 
Thus, if the TTAB does not consider the marketplace use of the parties’ marks, 
the TTAB’s decision should “have no later preclusive effect in a suit where 
actual usage in the marketplace is the paramount issue.”107  
As set forth in more detail below, it is common USPTO practice to use 
unsubstantiated claims in the registry in place of market evidence. The next 
Part demonstrates why federal courts should be especially cautious about 
deferring to USPTO findings of fact. For the sake of efficiency, examiners 
often approximate actual market presence through heuristics when making 
?
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1310. 
 102. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. at 1308. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
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trademark registration decisions. For this reason, de novo review in federal 
court is important to assure that trademark owners have access to a forum that 
will fully adjudicate registration decisions. 
IV.? THE USPTO USES HEURISTICS TO EFFICIENTLY 
REVIEW ITS GROWING VOLUME OF TRADEMARK 
APPLICATIONS 
The USPTO trademark examination process is a model of efficiency. 
Between 1985 and 2014, the USPTO received 5.9 million applications for a 
place on the Principal Register. 108  In 2017, the USPTO employed 549 
trademark examiners who were tasked with reviewing 594,107 trademark 
applications.109 On average, the 2017 data indicate that examiners spent less 
than two hours on each application.110 In that short window of time, the 
examiner determines use, distinctiveness, and whether the mark is available or 
likely to be confused with any of the millions of marks on the Principal 
Register.111 This task is monumental. To streamline this process, the USPTO 
uses several administrative heuristics in place of examining actual evidence of 
use, distinctiveness, and availability.  
The use of heuristics is not unique to USPTO examiners. It is a necessary 
feature of human decision-making. In their ground-breaking work, Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky explain that people cannot possibly process all 
available information in making decisions.112 For the sake of efficiency, we use 
cognitive short-cuts that Kahneman and Tversky call “heuristics.”113 My use 
of the term “heuristics” to describe USPTO practices is different in one 
important respect. While the short-cuts, defined by Kahneman and Tversky 
and developed by Richard Thaler, Dan Ariely and others, are subconscious, 
the administrative heuristics defined here are intentional features of USPTO 
?
 108. Beebe & Fromer, supra note 27, at 952 n.22. 
 109. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 
FY17 10, 85 tbl.16, 88 tbl.17, 185 tbl.18 (2018).  
 110. This rough estimate is based on aggregate data and does not take into account the 
experience of examiners or other variables that may affect the time spent on any particular 
application. The estimate was based on the following data from the USPTO. Dividing 594,107 
applications by 549 examiners results in each examiner reviewing an average of 1082.2 
applications. If each examiner had worked fifty weeks per year, each would have reviewed 
21.64 applications per week. Assuming a forty-hour work week, each examiner spent an 
average of 1.85 hours per application. 
 111. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (a)(1) (2012). 
 112. See AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, IN JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3 (Kahneman et al. eds., 
1982). 
 113. Id.  
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decision-making.114  
In order to process the multitude of applications against its growing 
Principal Register, the USPTO manages the registration process by applying 
multiple heuristics. These short-cuts and rules of thumb may be essential for 
administrative efficiency, but they are not an adequate substitute for genuine 
adjudication. For this reason, de novo review of USPTO decisions is important 
so that disappointed applicants can get a full hearing before a federal district 
judge who can take a genuine and deeper look at the facts.  
When examiners make registration decisions, they do their best in the 
limited time they have to review proposed marks for use in commerce, 
distinctiveness, and availability. An examiner does not have the time or 
resources on any of these three fact-intensive questions to gather actual market 
evidence that would normally be proffered if these issues were litigated in court. 
As explained below, these shortcuts routinely result in decisions that do not 
match market reality, and, therefore, should not be afforded deference by 
federal courts. If the USPTO rules of thumb and evidentiary short-cuts are 
permitted to take the place of actual fact-finding in court, they may lead to 
systematic failures to examine facts on many core trademark questions. The 
next Section illustrates many points in the registration process where 
trademark examiners use heuristics in place of evidence. 
A.? USE IN COMMERCE HEURISTICS 
Actual use of a distinctive symbol on particular goods or services is an 
essential prerequisite to trademark ownership. 115  Unlike patents and 
copyrights, trademark rights begin and end with use in commerce. Trademarks 
may be protected for the duration and in the field of the use, and they end 
when market use ceases. “[A] fundamental tenet of trademark law is that 
ownership of an inherently distinctive mark . . . is governed by priority of 
use.”116 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that,  
  
?
 114. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1471 (1998) (applying behavioral economics principles to legal decision-making, the 
authors illustrate multiple ways in which subconscious cognitive patterns explain human 
decision-making); DANIEL ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT 
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 173 (2008) (illustrating a series of experiments that show how 
predicatably irrational subconscious patterns explain human decision-making). 
 115. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (“The owner of a trademark used in commerce may request 
registration of its trademark on the principal register.”); Id. § 1127 (defining “use in commerce” 
to require “bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to 
reserve a right in a mark”). 
 116. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1047 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
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It is axiomatic in trademark law that the standard test of ownership 
is priority of use. To acquire ownership of a trademark it is not 
enough to have invented the mark first or even to have registered it 
first; the party claiming ownership must have been the first to 
actually use the mark in the sale of goods or services.117  
Before a mark will be registered, an applicant must identify the date on 
which it first began using the mark in connection with the claimed goods or 
services.118 Under the Lanham Act’s infringement provisions, the first to use a 
mark may stop “junior” users of confusingly similar symbols.119 Similarly, the 
Lanham Act bars registration of marks that are likely to cause confusion with 
marks already on the Principal Register. 120  And finally, when use ends, 
trademark rights and registrations should end as well.121 
It would be impracticable for the USPTO to verify actual use in commerce 
with respect to the millions of currently registered marks and compare them 
annually, for likelihood of confusion purposes, to actual use of the hundreds 
of thousands of applications for new marks. To make this task manageable, 
trademark examiners use USPTO TESS data and quick Internet searches in 
place of market evidence.122 The USPTO does collect some evidence of use in 
commerce. It requires applicants to submit one specimen showing use of its 
mark on a product or service in each international class. 123  Although an 
application may claim to use a mark on scores of goods and services in multiple 
classes, the USPTO will require the applicant to submit proof of use for only 
?
 117. Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996).  
 118. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2). 
 119. Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1047; Union Nat’l Bank v. Union Nat’l Bank, 909 
F.2d 839, 842–43 (5th Cir. 1990); Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 
1023 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 120. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). 
 121. Id. § 1127 (“A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ . . . when its use has been 
discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred from 
circumstances. Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment. 
‘Use’ of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the ordinary course of trade, 
and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.”). 
 122. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Searching Marks in USPTO Database, 
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/trademark-basics/searching-marks-
uspto-database [https://perma.cc/NV4W-7KA4] (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (“This search 
engine allows you to search the USPTO’s database of registered trademarks and prior pending 
applications to find marks that may prevent registration due to a likelihood of confusion 
refusal.”).  
 123. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.56(a) (“An application under section 1(a) of the Act, an amendment 
to allege use under § 2.76, and a statement of use under § 2.88 must each include one specimen 
per class showing the mark as used on or in connection with the goods or services. When 
requested by the Office as reasonably necessary to proper examination, additional specimens 
must be provided.”). 
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one item in each class.124 If the application matures to registration, all of the 
claimed goods and services are treated as though they were validated by similar 
evidence of use. This blanket presumption of validity often gives the mark 
owner broad national claims to exclusivity that may not be warranted. 
Consequently, the registration may be overbroad in multiple respects.  
First, the registration may cover a broad list of goods and services, even if 
the mark is used on only a subset of the items identified in the application. The 
USPTO considers the applicant’s sworn affidavit as proof of use and applies 
that entire statement for the five or ten-year duration of the registration, even 
if actual use on all or part of the goods and services never occurred or ended 
after the application was filed. General descriptions of goods and services are 
presumed to extend trademark rights to all goods and services of the type 
described.125 If a new entrant’s goods fall within a broad description in a prior 
registration, the USPTO presumes that both parties’ goods “travel in the same 
channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” 126  For example, if a 
trademark owner describes its goods as “computer programs,” that registration 
will block similar marks for all software. Even if a new entrant narrowly defines 
its market to clearly indicate its use is so distant from the registrant’s that the 
two would not be confused, the prior mark owners’ general description would 
block the new application.127 In this way, broad descriptions create substantial 
anti-competitive barriers for new applicants.128  
The second overbreadth problem is that applicants often face obstacles 
from marks that should no longer be on the registry. Registrations may remain 
?
 124. See id.; TMEP 1401.02(a) (providing that in 1973, the USPTO adopted the 
international classification system established by the Committee of Experts of the Nice Union 
and set forth in the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration 
of Marks (Nice Classification) published annually by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO)) (The USPTO adopted the forty-five international classes defined at 
Nice Classification, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/classifications/
nice/nclpub/en/fr/ [https://perma.cc/W3AQAN8N] (last visited Nov. 11, 2018)). 
 125. See, e.g., Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1007, 1025 
(T.T.A.B. 2015); In re N.A.D., Inc., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1872, 1874 (T.T.A.B. 2000). 
 126. In re Viterra Inc., 671a F.3d 1358, 1362, (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard 
Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  
 127. See In re Linkvest S.A., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1716 (T.T.A.B. 1992) (where registrant’s 
goods are broadly identified as “computer programs recorded on magnetic disks,” without 
limitation as to the kind of programs or the field of use, it must be assumed that registrant’s 
goods encompass all such computer programs, including computer programs of the type 
offered by applicant, that they travel in the same channels of trade normal for such goods, and 
that they are available to all classes of prospective purchasers of those goods) (“[W]ith respect 
to the goods, the question of likelihood of confusion must be determined on the basis of the 
goods set forth in applicant’s application and those in the cited registration, rather than on 
what [sic] any evidence may show those goods to be.”). 
 128. Beebe & Fromer, supra note 27, at 1035. 
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in the TESS data long after use of the mark has ended. For a trademark 
registration to endure, its owner must file an affidavit confirming continued 
use between the fifth and sixth year, and every ten years thereafter.129 One 
obvious problem created by the long lag time between renewals is that these 
multi-year windows enable registrations to remain alive for years after they are 
abandoned. Such “deadwood on the register prevents legitimate users from 
knowing what they can and can’t do.”130   
A recent USPTO study confirms the severity of this deadwood problem. 
In response to concerns that the Principal Register is cluttered with 
registrations of abandoned marks, the USPTO launched a pilot audit program 
in 2012. 131  The audit’s results unequivocally justified the concerns about 
clutter.132 The USPTO selected a statistically significant sample of 500 marks 
on the Principal Register and asked each mark owner to verify that it was still 
using the mark, and if so, to provide specimens documenting use for all the 
claimed goods and services.133 Approximately half of the mark owners did not 
submit evidence that they were using the marks as they had claimed in their 
registrations.134 As a result of the audit,  
172 of the registrations, or 34%, involved deletions of the goods 
and/or services queried under the pilot. In another 78 registrations, 
or 16%, the trademark owner failed to respond to the requirements 
of the pilot and any other issues raised during examination of the 
underlying maintenance filing, resulting in cancellation of the 
registration . . . of the 500 registrations selected for the pilot . . . 250 
registrations, or 50%, were unable . . . to verify the previously 
claimed use.135  
To continue improving the Principal Register’s integrity, the USPTO made 
the pilot auditing program permanent. In doing so, it acknowledged that 
registrations for marks  
that are not in use on all registered goods and services may 
unnecessarily block future applications. They also allow trademark 
owners to maintain rights they are not entitled to maintain. Because 
removing these registrations or deleting goods or services not in use 
?
 129. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1059, 1065 (2012). 
 130. Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark 
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 869 (2017). 
 131. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POST REGISTRATION PROOF OF USE 
PILOT STATUS REPORT (2015). 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. 
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is crucial for maintaining an accurate register, we made the program 
permanent.136  
The USPTO’s acknowledgement that the Principal Register does not often 
mirror use in commerce, resulting in significant overprotection, provides a 
strong basis for courts to conduct de novo review of USPTO likelihood of 
confusion decisions. Notwithstanding proof that a substantial number of 
marks should be narrowed or culled from the Principal Register, the USPTO 
is bound by statute to treat all registrations as valid. The Lanham Act provides 
that a certificate of federal trademark registration constitutes prima facie 
evidence that the owner has an exclusive right to use the mark in connection 
with all the goods or services listed in the registration.137 Once the registration 
is affirmed after five years, the mark becomes incontestable, meaning that the 
registration is deemed to constitute “conclusive evidence” of the mark’s 
validity.138 These terms are a bit misleading. Incontestable marks may still be 
contested. As detailed below, some bars, such as mere descriptiveness, are 
foreclosed, but incontestable marks remain vulnerable to a number of potential 
challenges, including abandonment.139 What is important for federal courts to 
note is that in many cases, the federal trademark registration establishes validity 
for claims that the mark owner may not be able to support with evidence of 
use in commerce. Therefore, the prima facie assumption of validity for 
registered marks can be a bubble that is easy to burst. 
The USPTO’s treatment of specimens creates a third set of overbreadth 
problems related to both use and distinctiveness. For efficiency reasons, the 
USPTO requires only one specimen for each item among what might be a very 
long list of products or services in each international class.140 Yet, the pilot audit 
established that use often cannot be verified. The USPTO has been inundated 
?
 136. Post Registration Proof of Use Audit Program, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-
maintaining-trademark-registration/post-registration-audit-program#Background 
[https://perma.cc/AGW7-PLFP] (last visited Nov. 11, 2018); see also 37 C.F.R 
§§ 2.161(h), 7.37(h). 
 137. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2012) (“A certificate of registration of a mark upon the 
principal register provided by this chapter shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the 
registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the mark, 
and of the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection 
with the goods or services specified in the certificate, subject to any conditions or limitations 
stated in the certificate.”). 
 138. Id. § 1115(b). 
 139. See infra notes 201–217 and accompanying text. 
 140. 37 C.F.R. § 2.56 (“An application under section 1(a) of the Act, an amendment to 
allege use under § 2.76, and a statement of use under § 2.88 must each include one specimen 
per class showing the mark as used on or in connection with the goods or services.”). 
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with fake or doctored specimens.141 To combat this form of fraud, the USPTO 
has initiated a pilot program that permits the public to protest improper 
specimens with objective market evidence.142 This audit program will hopefully 
help address the USPTO’s concerns that some specimens cannot be supported 
by evidence of genuine use in commerce. 
A fourth overbreadth issue results from the practice of treating one 
element of a brand as an independent mark even if the specimen indicates that 
the element is used in connection with more distinctive indicia. An examiner 
may permit protection for a color, word, phrase, packaging design, or other 
symbol that, in practice, is distinctive only when used in connection with 
additional words or other features. The Trademark Manual of Examining 
Procedure (TMEP) gives a detailed recipe for finding (or creating) a specimen 
that the USPTO will accept. The TMEP states that: 
The more prominently an applied-for mark appears on a web page, 
the more likely the mark will be perceived as a trademark. A mark 
may appear more prominent when the specimen: 
?? presents the mark in larger font size or different stylization 
or color than the surrounding text;  
?? places the mark at the beginning of a line or sentence;  
?? positions the mark next to a picture or description of the 
goods; or  
?? uses the “TM” designation with the applied-for mark 
(however, the designation alone does not transform a mark 
into a trademark if other considerations indicate it does not 
function as a trademark).143  
Mark owners may assert broad claims in words that follow this formula 
and obtain rights for terms that are not genuinely used in the market as an 
independent indicator of source. For example, the producers of a courtroom 
dramatization known as “We the People with Gloria Allred” asserted 
trademark rights in the phrase “WE THE PEOPLE” for use in connection 
with a variety of services.144 In addition to the courtroom drama television 
services they were actually providing, the application claimed use of the mark 
?
 141. Eric J. Perrott, Doctored Trademark Specimens at the USPTO: Analysis of the Plague of 
Fake Specimens Threatening to Undermine the Principal Register, 11 LANDSLIDE (2018). 
 142. TM Specimen Protests Email Pilot Program, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Specimen%20Protests%20Email%2
0Pilot%20Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU82-C3YX]. 
 143. TMEP § 904.03(i)(B)(1). 
 144. WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,179,972; WE THE PEOPLE, Registration 
No. 4,836,968; WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,837,090. 
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in connection with “providing programs in the field of law.”145 Because the 
words “we the people” introduce the preamble of the U.S. Constitution, they 
symbolize a unifying American vision of citizenry joined by foundational 
principles of law. For this reason, the USPTO should have questioned whether 
the applicant developed exclusive rights to the phrase “WE THE PEOPLE”  
for all programs related to law.146 The show submitted the following specimen 
in support of the application:147 
 
Although the application asserted trademark claims in the phrase “we the 
people,” the specimen shows use of the words in a longer phrase that includes 
the more commercially distinctive words: “with Gloria Allred.”148 Review of 
the specimens should have led the examiner to question whether “we the 
?
 145. WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,179,972. 
 146. WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,179,972. The phrase, without any qualifiers, 
has also been registered for cigars, firearms, bicycles, and coffee. Registration Nos. 5,241,608 
(cigars), 4,140,724 (bicycles), 4,489,575 (firearms), and 4,757,223 (coffee). 
 147. WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,179,972 (specimen submitted in color on 
April 18, 2018). 
 148. WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,179,972; WE THE PEOPLE, Registration 
No. 4,836,968; WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,837,090. 
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people” was used independently of other indicia as an independent source 
identifier.149 The examiner likely accepted the alleged use because the words 
“we the people” followed the rules set forth in the TMEP indicating that use 
as a mark is indicated when the claimed mark is depicted in “larger font size 
or different stylization or color than the surrounding text.”150 This example 
illustrates how literal application of the agency’s guidelines with regard to size 
of text and font can lead to overprotection when the guidelines are used in 
place of an actual examination of distinctiveness. A more careful review would 
have inquired into whether the words “we the people” create a distinct 
commercial impression apart from the words “with Gloria Allred.” In one 
instance, all six words appear together in the same font. Because another part 
of the specimen technically conformed to the TMEP’s guidelines by showing 
the claimed mark in a different font, the Applicant secured the registration 
without offering any evidence that it uses the ubiquitous American phrase “we 
the people” as a distinct and independent mark.151 The file suggests that the 
examiner conformed to agency heuristics without actually examining the 
“prime question [of] whether the designation . . . as actually used, will be 
recognized in and of itself as an indication of origin.”152  
Given that the USPTO does not collect evidence documenting the use of 
a mark on the entire scope of goods and services listed in applications, 
trademark registrations will often be broader than actual uses in commerce. 
Therefore, courts should be especially cautious in deferring to registration 
decisions and TTAB conclusions based on the same heuristics for use that are 
employed by the examiners. The Gloria Allred “WE THE PEOPLE” example 
indicates that administrative shortcuts may afford a mark protection even if no 
evidence is presented that the particular mark is used independently of other 
symbols appearing on the specimen. Notwithstanding its place on the Principal 
Register, a reasonable trier of fact may find that consumers never perceived 
“WE THE PEOPLE” to be distinctive of this show, and in any event, could 
find that since the show ended in 2012, the mark is no longer in use.153 
Nonetheless, the registration remains live in 2018. Others offering services in 
the field of law may seek to use this phrase, and to preserve their right to do 
so, courts should be able to engage in de novo review of the facts and 
conclusions of law that were quickly made before the registration was issued. 
?
 149. See WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,179,972; WE THE PEOPLE, 
Registration No. 4,836,968; WE THE PEOPLE, Registration No. 4,837,090. 
 150. TMEP § 904.03(i)(B)(1). 
 151. See id. 
 152. See MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 7:2. 
 153. See We the People with Gloria Allred, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1826567/ 
[https://perma.cc/3GSN-H6VK] (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). 
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B.? DISTINCTIVENESS HEURISTICS 
For a trademark to be protected under the Lanham Act, it must be 
“distinctive,” meaning that it must signal to consumers that the product or 
service comes from a particular company.154 Every time the USPTO reviews a 
trademark application, an examiner must put the proposed mark in one of two 
categories: (1) inherently distinctive and, therefore, automatically registrable, 
or (2) registrable only if the applicant submits proof that the mark is perceived 
as distinctive. A mark may be categorized as “inherently distinctive” if 
consumers would immediately recognize it as a brand. A made-up word (like 
Mipso for a musical group) would be inherently distinctive because the word 
has no meaning apart from referencing its source.155 Other marks must acquire 
distinctiveness through use over time.156 In order to protect competitors’ rights 
to use words describing their goods and services, marks consisting of 
descriptive words (such as American Airlines, Park-N-Fly, or University of 
North Carolina) could not be protected until consumers perceived them as 
distinctive. Even if they do become marks, the descriptive fair use defense 
protects competitive use of the words in descriptive text.157  
The better category—for ease of registration—is inherent distinctiveness. 
These symbols automatically signal to consumers that they are marks.158 If a 
mark is deemed inherently distinctive and is available, it will be admitted to the 
Principal Register without any proof of how it is perceived by consumers.159 
When an examiner finds that a symbol is not automatically distinctive as a 
source identifier, the examiner will require the owner to demonstrate “acquired 
distinctiveness” before registration will be permitted. 160  Trademark 
applications in this category will be denied registration unless the Applicant 
submits evidence of acquired distinctiveness, which is also known as 
“secondary meaning.” 161  Collecting direct evidence of trademark meaning 
would require the time and effort to obtain consumer testimony or conduct a 
survey of consumer reactions to a brand.162  
In reviewing trademark applications, examiners classify marks on a 
distinctiveness spectrum, often using the rubric set forth in Abercrombie & Fitch 
v. Hunting World, Inc.163 Marks that are “fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive” in 
?
 154. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012). 
 155. See MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 11.4. 
 156. See id. §§ 11.2, 11.4. 
 157. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(4). 
 158. See MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 11.4. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. § 15.1. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. § 15.30. 
 163. 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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relation to the claimed goods or services will be classified as inherently 
distinctive because they are thought to automatically signal brand meaning.164 
When an examiner puts a mark in one of these three categories, the USPTO 
will automatically register it without any proof of acquired distinctiveness.165  
Fanciful marks are those that were invented for the purpose of being a 
unique brand, and therefore are thought to clearly convey a trademark message 
because they have no other known meaning.166 Examples of fanciful marks 
include Pepsi, Xerox, and Claritin.167 They are the platinum standard, created 
to convey nothing but trademark significance.168 The second-highest category 
on the distinctiveness spectrum are arbitrary marks which use common words 
in unexpected ways.169 Examples include “Ivory” for soap and “Apple” for 
computers.170 Both fanciful and arbitrary marks are relatively easy to classify 
for examiners who may use dictionaries to confirm whether they fit in one of 
these two categories.171 
Suggestive marks constitute the third category considered inherently 
distinctive. These marks evoke a quality of the goods and services without 
directly describing them. Suggestive marks sit just above the line of inherent 
distinctiveness because they are neither arbitrary nor clearly descriptive.172 One 
commonly cited definition of the critical line dividing suggestive from 
descriptive marks states that “[a] term is suggestive if it requires imagination, 
thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods. A term 
is descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, 
qualities or characteristics of the goods.”173 For example, “NIKE” has been 
?
 164. MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 11.4 (“Fanciful, arbitrary and suggestive words used 
as marks are regarded as being ‘inherently distinctive.’”). 
 165. Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11. 
 166. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2012) (“No trademark by which the goods of the applicant 
may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal 
register on account of its nature unless it . . . [c]onsists of a mark which (1) when used on or 
in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive.”). 
 167. U.S. Hosiery Corp. v. Gap, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 800, 812 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (providing 
“Pepsi” or “Exxon” as examples of “coined, purely fanciful, words”). 
 168. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11. 
 169. Id. at 10 n.12. 
 170. See id. at 9 n.6. 
 171. See, e.g., Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 
396 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (VEUVE—meaning WIDOW in French—held to be 
“an arbitrary term as applied to champagne and sparkling wine, and thus conceptually strong 
as a trademark”). 
 172. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 10. 
 173. Id. at 11 (citing Stix Prods. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)). 
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classified as suggestive for athletic clothing and equipment.174 One who first 
saw a product labeled Nike (before it became more famous than its 
mythological namesake) would not directly know anything about the product 
from the name. Nonetheless, a consumer familiar with the mythological 
reference might imagine a product or service that had something to do with 
flight, speed, wings, or victory. The category of suggestive marks is notoriously 
difficult to define. Even leading trademark commentators concede that this 
question of fact is irredeemably subjective.  
The next category of symbols sits just below those that are suggestive and 
are unified in what they cannot be: inherently distinctive. These marks do not 
automatically signal their source but may acquire distinctiveness through 
market use that results in consumer brand recognition. The Lanham Act puts 
descriptive words, surnames, and truthful geographic references in this 
category of marks, for which the applicants must demonstrate 
distinctiveness.175 Marks consisting of a single color (independent of other 
design elements or text) and product designs also must have secondary 
meaning before they may be registered.176 Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act bars 
these marks from the Principal Register unless the applicant proves that the 
mark has become distinctive for the claimed goods and services.177  
A word mark or design may be classified as descriptive if it references any 
feature of the claimed goods and services, such as an ingredient, flavor, quality, 
characteristic, function, purpose, or use of the specified goods or services.178 
Examples of marks held to be descriptive include: “Frosty Treats” for frozen 
desserts,179 “New York Fashion Week” for a week dedicated to fashion shows 
in New York City,180 and “Wounded Warrior Project” for a charity dedicated 
to wounded veterans.181 Before descriptive words or colors may be registered, 
the USPTO requires the applicant to demonstrate that the symbol conveys 
brand-specific meaning.  
?
 174. Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int’l, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-1468-GEB-JFM, 2007 WL 2782030, at 
*7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007) (finding that “NIKE is, at the very least, suggestive”). 
 175. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), (2), (4) & (f) (2012). 
 176. See Qualitex Co. v. Johnson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (holding that color can 
be registered as a trademark to the extent that it met the ordinary requirements); see also Wal-
Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (holding that product’s design has to acquire 
secondary meaning to prove its distinctiveness). 
 177. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). 
 178. See In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that “apple pie” was merely 
descriptive of potpourri). 
 179. See Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 
2005). 
 180. See Fashion Week, Inc. v. Council of Fashion Designers of Am., Inc., No.16-cv-5079 
(JGK), 2016 WL 4367990 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2016). 
 181. See WWP, Inc. v. Wounded Warriors, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 2d 970 (D. Neb. 2008). 
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The line between suggestive and descriptive marks is “blurry” and so 
subjective that decision makers must be careful “to follow something more 
objective than a spontaneous, ‘gut-reaction’ test.”182 There is nothing precise 
or scientific about this process. If a mark sits on the line between suggestive 
and descriptive, the classification decision will be so unpredictable that no two 
decision makers can be expected to replicate each other’s results. “[W]hen 
almost indistinguishable semantic pigeon-holes are constructed and labelled 
‘descriptive’ and ‘suggestive,’ no two human beings, including judges, will place 
a given set of marks into the same category.” 183  Consequently, many 
descriptive marks will slip through as suggestive and register without any 
evidence that they are perceived by consumers as commercially distinctive. 
The final category of generic terms and functional features sits just below 
the trademark floor and are barred from registration. Generic words may not 
be registered at all because they say what a product is, not who sells it.184 Unlike 
descriptive words, which may overcome this bar by proof that consumers 
perceive the term as distinctive, no amount of consumer recognition can turn 
a generic word into a protectable trademark.185  A combination of generic 
words may be found generic and unregistrable if the combination does not 
communicate source to consumers. 186  For example, “CloudTV” was held 
generic for video services provided over the Internet,187 and “Coffee Flour” 
was deemed generic for flour made from coffee beans.188 The policies of 
protecting free expression and promoting fair competition justify the 
distinctiveness requirement for registering descriptive terms and the bar 
against registering generic terms.  
The pivotal classification decision is wholly based on the examiner’s 
perception of the symbol and understanding of the market. The “lines of 
demarcation” between each category are “not always bright.”189 The examiners 
develop expertise in making these decisions, but due to the subjective nature 
of the analysis, the limited experience and resources of each examiner, and 
ever-expanding new markets, administrative trademark decisions will not 
?
 182. MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 11:71. 
 183. Id. § 11:70. 
 184. See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 
(9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he name of the product or service itself—what [the product] is, and as 
such . . . the very antithesis of a mark.”). 
 185. Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1975) (explaining 
“that even proof of secondary meaning, by virtue of which some ‘merely descriptive’ marks 
may be registered, cannot transform a generic term into a subject for trademark”). 
 186. See In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 187. See In re ActiveVideo Networks, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1582 (T.T.A.B. 2014). 
 188. See In re Empire Tech. Dev. LLC, 123 U.S.P.Q.2d 1544 (BNA) (T.T.A.B. 2017). 
 189. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9. 
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always reflect market reality. Words that sit on the border between suggestive 
and descriptive, or descriptive and generic, are especially vulnerable to 
becoming registered without any evidence that they actually send a distinctive 
signal. In order for the USPTO to get these tough decisions made efficiently 
and with some consistency across individual examiners, it has developed 
heuristics, or short-cuts, that examiners use as proxies for marketplace 
evidence.   
1. Availability 
Examiners often use availability in the USPTO’s TESS data as a heuristic 
for distinctiveness. When a claimed mark consisting of one or more descriptive 
words is not on the Principal Register, the examiner may conclude that the 
mark is distinctive. When examiners use TESS availability in this way, as a 
proxy for distinctiveness, the risks of overprotection and anticompetitive harm 
increase. Such risks may be especially salient when the USPTO evaluates 
trademark applications for new technologies or products. 
For example, the creator of stomp rockets applied to register the name of 
its toy which propels a rocket when a child stomps on a launching device.190 
The USPTO issued an office action asserting that the word “rocket” was 
descriptive and required a disclaimer. No one else had registered the 
combination of these two descriptive words. The USPTO permitted “STOMP 
ROCKET” to register without proof of secondary meaning.  
When Sears and JC Penny tried to sell their own branded stomp rockets, 
the owner of the federal trademark registration sued.191 The district court 
deferred to the “facts” set forth in the registration and pushed aside evidence 
that “stomp rocket” had become the generic name for this type of toy. The 
court grounded its validity analysis on the finding that “the USPTO did not 
request from Plaintiff evidence of secondary meaning . . . [and] [s]ignificant 
weight must be attached to this registration and this Court must infer that the 
USPTO concluded that the marks were, at the least, suggestive.”192 Given that 
both words were descriptive of core product features, it is unclear why the 
examiner did not require evidence of secondary meaning. Yet, instead of 
questioning that initial subjective judgment call, the federal district court 
deferred to it and prohibited the competitors from using the words that would 
convey to consumers what the product is. The anticompetitive effects of such 
decisions can be avoided if courts routinely review the facts de novo rather 
?
 190. STOMP ROCKET, Registration. No. 2,221,554 (“[T]oys, namely, flying winged 
tubes and structural parts therefor . . . .”). 
 191. See JFJ Toys, Inc. v. Sears Holdings Corp., 237 F. Supp. 3d 311, 319–20 (D. Md. 
2017). 
 192. Id. at 330 (internal citations omitted). 
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than according deference, especially in situations where the examiner’s 
decision was not based on evidence but on a subjective call favoring one side 
of a blurry line. A proper application of the de novo standard would protect 
competitors and consumers against such anticompetitive results.  
Dictionaries constitute another source used to determine distinctiveness. 
If a word (or combination of words) appears in many TESS marks and in the 
dictionary it may be considered descriptive and not distinctive. Unfortunately, 
examiners may also conclude that the opposite is true and use absence in a 
dictionary as a heuristic for inherent distinctiveness. If a word does not appear 
in a dictionary, it may be found to pass the “dictionary test” and be deemed 
not descriptive.193 However, new words and combinations of words should be 
evaluated for distinctiveness even if they do not yet appear in dictionaries. The 
absence of a word in a dictionary or a definition that includes only a term’s 
trademark meaning may indicate that the term has not yet been vetted by 
lexicographers or that an entry was altered or deleted after the dictionary’s 
publisher received a cease and desist letter.194 Third party registrations that 
include the term in question may also be used as a heuristic for 
nondescriptiveness.195 
The STOMP ROCKET example illustrates how the availability heuristic 
can make an examiner’s job easier, but can interfere with market competition 
later.196 If a word mark does not fail any of the typical tests by appearing in a 
dictionary or descriptive text used by the applicant or competitors, the 
consequential impression of availability becomes a heuristic to support 
?
 193.  
[T]he dictionary definition of the word is an appropriate and relevant 
indication ‘of the ordinary significance and meaning of words’ to the public 
. . . . A third test used by courts and commentators to classify descriptive 
marks is “whether competitors would be likely to need the terms used in 
the trademark in describing their products. 
See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 792–93 (5th Cir. 1983). A 
descriptive term generally relates so closely and directly to a product or service that other 
merchants marketing similar goods would find the term useful in identifying their own goods. 
 194. Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademarks, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427, 494–
99 (2010). 
 195. See MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 11.20. (“Third party mark registrations may in 
some cases support the argument that a designation is not descriptive. The fact that the 
USPTO. registered a number of marks containing the same designation without requiring 
proof of secondary meaning is some evidence that the PTO considers the designation not 
descriptive.”). 
 196. JFJ Toys, Inc. v. Sears Holdings Corp., 237 F. Supp. 3d 311, 333(D. Md. 2017). 
(finding that the claim “Stomp Rocket” had become generic was undermined by the fact that 
the words did not appear together in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary). 
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nondescriptiveness.197  
Words that describe the product or its purpose should be classified as 
descriptive and require proof of distinctiveness to qualify for trademark 
registration. But multiple heuristics permit marks to register with 
circumstantial evidence of distinctiveness or no evidence at all. USPTO 
examiners should remember the Supreme Court’s directive that, in close calls, 
one should err on the side of requiring proof of distinctiveness.198 When the 
examiner makes a call in favor of inherent distinctiveness, a symbol may 
immediately, albeit incorrectly, obtain the presumption of validity afforded to 
marks on the Principal Register. De novo review would preserve the 
opportunity to correct such results. 
2. Incontestability 
The automatic ripening from registration to incontestability compounds 
the risks of overprotecting marks that are not factually defensible as distinctive 
source identifiers. While the registration ages, the term may not become more 
distinctive. Nonetheless, if renewed, the registration will automatically become 
incontestable and more difficult to undo. Marks that obtain registration are 
immediately cloaked with a statutory presumption of validity. A USPTO 
decision to “register a mark without requiring proof of secondary meaning 
affords a rebuttable presumption that the mark is suggestive or arbitrary or 
fanciful rather than merely descriptive.”199 New evidence may be necessary to 
undo a registration decision, even one made based on incomplete, subjective, 
or faulty assumptions.  
After five years, if the mark owner reapplies for registration, the mark will 
automatically become “incontestable” and can no longer be cancelled on the 
basis of being merely descriptive.200 Incontestability provides a heightened 
presumption of validity over other registrations. The Lanham Act provides 
that incontestability is “conclusive evidence of the validity of . . . the 
registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce.” 201 
Therefore, a mark’s presence on the Principal Register becomes an 
administrative heuristic for evidence of distinctiveness even if no evidence was 
?
 197. See, e.g., Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. Ryan, CIV. A. 89-5574-R., 1989 WL 167604, at *3 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 1989) (“MUSICSOFT can be considered an arbitrary mark since it is not 
found in any English dictionary.”). 
 198. See Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000) (stating in the trade 
dress context, that in “close cases, we believe that courts should err on the side of caution and 
. . . thereby requiring secondary meaning”). 
 199. Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 200. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b) (2012). 
 201. Id. § 1115(b). 
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ever put before the USPTO.202  
In a study of trademark incontestability, Professor Rebecca Tushnet 
concluded that “no one should be made better off by providing inaccurate 
information to the PTO. Unfortunately, it is currently possible to benefit from 
doing so.” 203  Despite the power and strength incontestability confers, no 
substantive examination occurs at this point in the registration process.204 An 
affidavit containing the required information and attesting to a claim of 
continuous use is all that is required, and the heightened status is conferred 
automatically.205 “Incontestability’s main bite is in preventing any challenge to 
the registration on the grounds that the mark lacks secondary meaning . . . .”206   
Once incontestable status has been achieved, a competitor may only use 
the word if it can establish that the mark is generic or that its use falls under a 
fair use defense.207 Both strategies may involve expensive litigation.208 If courts 
review USPTO classification decisions de novo, a competitor who wants to 
fight for the opportunity to use descriptive words will have some avenue to 
assert such a claim. The Lanham Act permits courts to question 
incontestability decisions,209 and given the heuristics used in the registration 
process, they should not hesitate to do so.  
To ensure fair competition and free expression in the use of descriptive 
words, the federal judiciary should not give up their authority on this issue. 
Judges should also use their power to order corrections to the Principal 
Register in appropriate circumstances. For example, a district court narrowed 
?
 202. Tushnet, supra note 92, at 435–36. 
 203. Tushnet, supra note 92, at 455. 
 204. See id. at 436, 450; MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 19:140; TMEP § 1605. 
 205. Tushnet, supra note 92, at 440–46 (documenting clear errors in USPTO conferring 
incontestable status). 
 206. Id. at 438. 
 207. The Lanham Act limits trademark rights in descriptive terms. In addition to being 
more difficult to obtain, these trademarks are more difficult to enforce. They are subject to 
the descriptive fair use defense defined in the Lanham Act as “use of the name, term, or device 
charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark . . . of a term or device which 
is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of 
such party, or their geographic origin.” 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012). KP Permanent Make-
Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004) (holding that “the common 
law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the part of consumers followed from the 
very fact that in cases like this one an originally descriptive term was selected to be used as a 
mark, not to mention the undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly 
on use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it first”). 
 208. See Tushnet, supra note 92, at 439. 
 209. See id. at 450 (quoting Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Int’l. N.V., 623 F.3d 
61, 63 (2d Cir. 2010) and asserting that an incontestable registration “does not prevent courts 
from asking whether a claimant is in fact entitled to its benefit”).   
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Louboutin’s registration of a red undersole for shoes.210 In its application, 
Louboutin claimed the exclusive right to use red on the undersole of shoes, 
irrespective of the color of other portions of the shoe.211 It sued Yves Saint 
Laurent, not for providing a similar contrasting pop of red, but for an entirely 
red shoe. 212  After evaluating the evidence, the district court ordered the 
USPTO to narrow the registration to situations where Louboutin actually had 
proof of distinctiveness: an undersole that contrasted with the upper portions 
of the shoe.213 Litigants who go to the trouble of obtaining such relief in federal 
courts should remember to petition the USPTO to cancel or narrow the 
registration. As the SEALTIGHT saga demonstrates, if they do not, they may 
later be stuck with results based on the Principal Register and lose all that was 
gained in litigation.214  
C.? LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION HEURISTICS 
In addition to use and distinctiveness, the USPTO must also determine 
whether a symbol is confusingly similar to any previously registered marks. If 
so, section 2(d) of the Lanham Act bars registration.215  Two-thirds of all 
applications must overcome at least one USPTO office action, and “likelihood 
of confusion” is the most common basis asserted. When a new entrant 
responds that the cited mark is no longer in use, the USPTO will generally 
treat evidence of actual market use as irrelevant. A junior user may claim that 
a senior mark owner has abandoned its mark, and therefore the junior user’s 
mark should be registered. This argument could win in court, but it will always 
fail before the USPTO because trademark examiners cannot consider evidence 
that market use does not match claims made in existing registrations.216 When 
new entrants assert that a mark is not actually in use as claimed in a prior 
registration, examiners respond with the following standard text, “[w]ith 
?
 210. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 
(2d Cir. 2012). 
 211. See id. at 213. 
 212. Id. 
 213. The mark consists of a red lacquered outsole on footwear that contrasts with the 
color of the adjoining (“upper”) portion of the shoe, Registration No. 3,361,597. 
 214. See supra notes 88–101 and accompanying text.  
 215. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012):  
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished 
from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal 
register on account of its nature unless it . . . [c]onsists of or comprises a 
mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark 
Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by 
another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection 
with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or 
to deceive. 
 216. See TMEP § 1207.01(a)(iii). 
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respect to applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services, the question of 
likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods 
and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on 
extrinsic evidence of actual use.”217 
There are, of course, many good reasons why the USPTO treats claims in 
registrations as presumptively valid. The Lanham Act requires them to do so. 
The presumption of validity protects the rights of mark owners who are not 
parties to pre-publication application proceedings, and therefore, are not 
present to defend their intellectual property. Any mark on the Principal or 
Supplemental Registers may be cited in an office action as evidence of a prior 
mark that should bar a new mark that is confusingly similar. These proceedings 
involve only the USPTO and the applicant. The owners of the cited marks are 
not present to defend attacks against the facts stated in their mark’s federal 
registration.218 In registration proceedings, due process concerns prevent new 
entrants from challenging current registrations with marketplace evidence that 
would be used in court. The trademark registration system has two 
mechanisms available to mark owners who think their trademark rights might 
be harmed by a new entrant. If the USPTO permits the applicant’s mark to 
publish or register, those harmed by such a decision may later challenge it 
through a post publication opposition or post registration cancellation 
proceeding.219 
The unfortunate consequence of this practice is that it burdens new 
entrants with the necessity of clearing the deadwood from the Principal 
Register. They must file separate cancellation proceedings against each cited 
mark in order to challenge the breadth of goods and services or continued use 
of the cited registrations. Each of these proceedings would be time-consuming 
and expensive. A more efficient practice would require the mark owners to 
submit proof of continued use to the USPTO if a new entrant provides 
evidence of abandonment. 
Federal courts should be mindful of the limited likelihood of confusion 
analysis that happens at the USPTO. In determining whether a mark is 
?
 217. Office Action (Official Letter), U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, About Applicant’s 
Trademark Application, U.S. Application Serial No. 86,124,578 (Apr. 2, 2014 5:43:50 PM); see 
Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 
TMEP § 1207.01(a)(iii) (“The nature and scope of a party’s goods or services must be 
determined on the basis of the goods or services recited in the application or registration.”). 
 218. See Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865 (S.D. Ind. 2003), 
aff’d, 357 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Honeywell’s request to defer to the TTAB’s 
decision because “the TTAB made its decision in an ex parte proceeding, without the benefit 
of a true adversary who had a strong incentive to present—and the ability to find—evidence 
that would have undermined Honeywell’s arguments”). 
 219. TMEP §§ 1503.03, 1607. 
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available, the USPTO relies on its registry instead of actual use in commerce. 
Accordingly, federal courts should remember that many “likelihood of 
confusion” decisions made by the USPTO are not based on evidence of 
market use. Instead, the USPTO uses bare allegations from the Principal 
Register that, when audited, often cannot be substantiated.220 
In an ex parte registration proceeding, the USPTO and the TTAB do not 
have the authority to limit or cancel third-party marks that are not used as 
stated on the Principal Register. In trademark infringement cases, federal 
courts do have that authority and, as a result, should not defer to administrative 
decisions by the USPTO or TTAB which lack such powers. Section 37 of the 
Lanham Act empowers federal courts to cancel all or part of a trademark 
registration when evidence indicates that a symbol has become generic.221 
When federal courts use this power, they ensure that administrative heuristics 
do not undermine the foundational trademark policy of supporting fair 
competition by assuring that no one can maintain a monopoly on a mark that 
is no longer in use.222 
V.? THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF TRADEMARKS PROVIDES 
AN ADDITIONAL REASON TO AVOID DEFERENCE 
The dynamic nature of trademarks is another reason why federal courts 
should avoid deferring to the USPTO. Trademark rights expand and contract 
as a function of constantly changing market dynamics. In stark contrast, other 
forms of intellectual property have neatly ordered lives. They are created; they 
last for a set term of years, and then they expire, permitting the underlying 
work to enter the public domain. A copyright term begins when original 
expression is fixed and generally lasts for the author’s life plus seventy years.223 
When it expires, the work enters the public domain.224 Utility patents have a 
?
 220. See supra notes 88–101 and accompanying text. 
 221. See 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2012). 
 222. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97, (1918) (holding 
that “[t]here is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an 
established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed. The law of 
trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition; the right to a particular 
mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its function is simply to designate the 
goods as the product of a particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale of 
another’s product as his; and it is not the subject of property except in connection with an 
existing business”). 
 223. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 302–305 (2012) (providing that contemporary copyrights endure 
for the “life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death” or for works made for hire, 
“the copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term 
of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first”). 
 224. See id. §§ 302–305. 
680 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:643 
?
similar linear life that is generally limited to twenty years from the date of 
application if the USPTO ultimately finds that the invention is patentable.225 
Both patent and trade secret protection may be foreclosed by public 
disclosures made in the patent application process. When a patent application 
is denied, the claimed invention enters the public domain.226 Rights of publicity 
generally expire when the celebrity dies or within a term of years afterwards.227 
Once these fixed intellectual property terms end, the names, expressive works, 
and inventions enter the public domain and become freely available for public 
use unless they also infringe a trademark right.  
Trademarks are different. They begin with use in commerce, not creation 
or a federal grant of exclusivity.228 Trademarks do not need to be novel or 
original to merit protection. Unlike patents, copyrights, and rights of publicity, 
trademarks have no set expiration date.229 If carefully tended, they can last 
forever.230 Rather than decreasing in value over time as a work gets close to 
entering the public domain, trademark strength can increase indefinitely. A 
long history of use is one metric thought to support a mark’s strength.231 If 
well curated, trademark rights may become more robust over time and last 
forever.232   
Like other forms of intellectual property, trademarks are still vulnerable to 
challenges. The Lanham Act expressly provides for the possibility of a 
?
 225. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (providing that utility patents are in effect “for a term 
beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which 
the application for the patent was filed in the United States”).   
 226. See id. § 102(a) (providing that a “person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the 
claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, 
or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention 
. . .”); see also Rototron Corp. v. Lake Shore Burial Vault Co., 712 F.2d 1214, 1215 (7th Cir. 
1983) (stating that because the issuance of a patent allowed knowledge to pass into the public 
domain a patent signified public disclosure and precluded trade secret protection); Scharmer 
v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that a patent constitutes public 
disclosure after which any “property right in a trade secret” is extinguished). 
 227. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2012) (right of publicity claims may “not be 
brought under this section by reason of any use of a deceased personality’s name, voice, 
signature, photograph, or likeness occurring after the expiration of 70 years after the death of 
the deceased personality”). 
 228. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (2012); 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–305 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 154. 
 229. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058; 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–305; 35 U.S.C. § 154. 
 230. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058. 
 231. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539, 543 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (noting that 
unlike patent law, “trademark law . . . provides for the grant of rights to the trademark owner 
for an indefinite time period”). 
 232. See Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(“Trademark rights last for an indefinite period, depending on the strength and duration of 
the public’s recognition that the mark identifies the producer’s goods.”); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 
1059. 
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registered mark to lose its protection at “any time.”233 Notwithstanding the 
strong presumption of validity for all registered marks, they are all subject to 
cancellation.234 Federal registrations will expire if the owner does not file an 
affidavit alleging continued use at each renewal interval and may be cancelled 
for a number of additional reasons. 235  Marks that have not achieved 
incontestable status (those in the first five years of their registered life) may 
also be challenged for any reason listed in Section 2 of the Lanham Act, such 
as the claim that a mark is merely descriptive and has not acquired secondary 
meaning. 236  Although the Lanham Act provides that an incontestable 
registration is “conclusive evidence” of the facts in a registration certificate, 
even these registrations may be cancelled if the mark is abandoned, becomes 
generic or functional, or if the registration was obtained fraudulently.237 Failure 
to use a mark for three years without an intent to resume use constitutes prima 
facie evidence of abandonment.238 A registration may also be cancelled if the 
applicant made fraudulent claims in its application.239 
Word marks that were once distinctive sometimes become the generic 
name for a product, and then can no longer maintain a place on the Register.240 
The Lanham Act classifies this cessation of rights as abandonment, even 
though the loss may be caused as much by competitors and consumers as the 
mark owners themselves.241 If a word answers the question “What are you?” it 
has become the generic name of a product and may not be protected as a 
mark.242 If, however, the word answers the questions “Who are you?” or “Who 
vouches for you?” it may be protected as a trademark.243 Examples of marks 
that were once federally registered but were cancelled by a federal court on the 
basis that they became generic include “YO-YO,” “ASPIRIN,” 
?
 233. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (providing that a registration may be cancelled “[a]t any time if 
the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services”). 
 234. See id.    
 235. See id. § 1059.    
 236. Id. § 1064.  
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. § 1127. 
 239. Id. § 1064. 
 240. See id.; Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 611 F.2d 296, 304 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(“If the primary significance of the trademark is to describe the type of product rather than 
the producer, the trademark has become a generic term and is no longer a valid trademark.”). 
 241. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (“The primary significance of the registered mark to the 
relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the 
registered mark has become the generic name . . . .”). 
 242. Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
 243. Id. 
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“ESCALATOR,” “TRAMPOLINE,” and “SUPER GLUE.”244   
In addition to words, trademark registrations also extend to a category of 
nontextual symbols or trade dress245 which includes product packaging (like 
the Coca-Cola bottle), product design (the shape of a Ferrari car), and colors 
(like Tiffany’s robin’s egg blue). 246  Registrations for trade dress may be 
cancelled at any time if a challenger proves that the symbol is functional.247 
While some courts have held that such a loss is irreversible no matter how 
much secondary meaning a generic or functional symbol acquires, others have 
found that marks that have lost protection for being functional may regain 
protection if the symbol’s owner proves that the mark is no longer functional 
and has reacquired commercial distinctiveness.248  
The scope of trademark rights is also malleable. Copyright and patent 
protection are limited to the work or invention identified in the application, 
and federal law expressly prohibits expansion of the right beyond that initial 
scope.249 Trademark rights are different in that they may expand or contract as 
?
 244. See Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 668 (7th Cir. 1965) 
(holding that “yo-yo” is no longer a valid trademark); Bayer v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 
515–16 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (allowing competitor to market its drug under the term “Aspirin” to 
the public since the word had already entered into public domain); Haughton Elevator Co. v. 
Seeberger, 40 Trademark Rep. 326, 326–27 (1950) (cancelling 50-year-old registration for 
“escalator”); Loctite Corp. v. Nat’l Starch & Chem. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190, 217–19 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) (cancelling supplemental registration because the term “Super Glue” was used and 
understood as a term that was generic); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Am. Trampoline Co., 193 
F. Supp. 745, 755–56 (S.D. Iowa 1961) (holding that the term “trampoline” is “generic and in 
the public domain and cannot be exclusively appropriated for trademark usage”). 
 245. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992) (explaining 
that the “‘trade dress’ of a product is essentially its total image and overall appearance . . . [it] 
involves the total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, color or 
color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques”) (citations omitted). 
 246. The trademark consists of the distinctively shaped contour, Registration No. 
72,069,873; the mark consists of the configuration of an automobile, Registration No. 
3,743,490; TIFFANY BLUE, Registration No. 4,804,204. 
 247. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 23 (2001) (“Trade dress 
can be protected under federal law, but the person asserting such protection in an infringement 
action must prove that the matter sought to be protected is not functional.”); see also Sweet St. 
Desserts, Inc. v. Chudleigh’s Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 3d 530, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“A registered 
trademark is always subject to cancellation as functional.”). 
 248. See, e.g., Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 357 F.3d 649, 653 (interpreting 
TrafFix to support the contention that “what was once functional may half a century later be 
ornamental”). 
 249. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012) (“The copyright in a compilation or derivative work 
extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the 
preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the 
preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or 
enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the 
preexisting material.”); 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2012) (stating that any proposed amendment or new 
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a function of use in commerce. Nothing in the Lanham Act prevents a mark 
owner from applying for additional registrations on a previously owned mark 
if it expands its use to new products or services not previously claimed. The 
Lanham Act also permits federal trademark registrations to be cancelled or 
narrowed if a mark owner abandons the mark or continues to use it in 
connection with only a subset of the goods or services identified in the existing 
registration.250 
As noted above, many forms of intellectual property rights last for a fixed 
number of years, and once the term of protection ends, the right cannot be 
recovered.251 Trademarks are different because they can expand or contract, or 
lost and then reacquired. If a mark is denied registration because it lacks 
secondary meaning, the applicant may later obtain registration for the same 
mark if he or she can provide the USPTO with evidence of distinctive use in 
commerce. Applicants whose registrations were rejected for being confusingly 
similar to a senior mark may also reapply and obtain a registration if the senior 
user’s registration lapses.252 
Trademarks are also the only form of intellectual property that can die and 
be revived. They are like zombies: any abandoned trademark can be 
resuscitated through use, take on a new life, and become stronger than it ever 
was before. An administrative pronouncement of death does not mean that 
the trademark cannot rise again.  
The dynamic nature of trademarks as symbols and the forward-looking 
nature of the likelihood of confusion standard means that a decision that might 
have made sense at one time can and will be revisited if it is relitigated later. 
The likelihood of confusion analysis involves consideration of at least eight 
factual variables. 253  It is a predictive standard designed to assess future 
?
claim that attempts to enlarge the preexisting patent is prohibited under ex parte review); 35 
U.S.C. § 316(d)(3) (forbidding enlargement of the patent under inter partes review); 5 U.S.C. 
§ 326(d)(3) (2012) (forbidding enlargement of the patent under post-grant review). 
 250. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064. 
 251. 35 U.S.C. § 154. Before 1989, copyrights could also be lost by publication without 
the requisite notice. See Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study, 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 141 (2011). 
 252. 15 U.S.C. § 1095. 
 253.  
Where the products are different, the prior owner’s chance of success is a 
function of many variables: the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity 
between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that 
the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of 
defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s 
product, and the sophistication of the buyers. Even this extensive catalogue 
does not exhaust the possibilities—the court may have to take still other 
variables into account.  
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consumer perceptions based on the status quo. Because the likelihood of 
confusion standard is applied to the changing symbols of at least two 
organizations, the factual grounding for the analysis is constantly shifting. 
While the symbols themselves may remain the same, as the evidence of market 
use changes, the predictive likelihood of confusion standard may yield results 
that differ substantially from a past decision. Consequently, as the 
SEALTIGHT saga illustrates, the same two parties may relitigate infringement 
questions involving the same two symbols, as their markets and consumer 
understandings evolve.254  Given the multitude of trademark variables that 
change over time, deference to any past decision can be problematic.  
The next Part turns to yet another reason why de novo review of trademark 
matters is appropriate. Deference is not accorded when agencies interpret 
provisions, like the United States Constitution, that are outside the scope of 
the agency’s specialized administrative responsibility. 255  Due to the many 
expressive interests at issue in trademark matters, judicial decisions should be 
informed by expertise outside the field of trademark law.  
VI.? TRADEMARK EXPERTISE CAN CREATE AN ECHO 
CHAMBER THAT DROWNS OUT OTHER  
RELEVANT MODES OF INQUIRY 
When anyone is faced with a decision outside one’s area of expertise, 
deference to an expert is a sensible instinct. Deference to the USPTO on 
trademark matters may be especially tempting given the agency’s expertise in 
trademark law. But before such deference is accorded, it makes sense to 
examine whether the USPTO or federal courts are institutionally better 
situated to decide fact-intensive trademark questions.  
Another important question to consider is whether the USPTO is best 
suited to analyze trademark matters that implicate important legal issues 
outside trademark law. When experts analyze the world through a particular 
paradigm, they may not be as open to other modes of inquiry. For this reason, 
great trademark expertise in the USPTO could result in a trademark echo 
chamber where trademark ideas drown out other important doctrines that 
intersect with this economic and expressive area of law. Given the heuristics 
outlined above, a federal court may be the only forum where a trademark 
litigant has a genuine shot of introducing evidence and expertise from other 
?
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 254. See supra notes 88–101 and accompanying text. 
 255. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ametek, Inc., 104 F.3d 558, 562 (3d Cir. 1997); Scheduled 
Airlines Traffic Offices, Inc. v. Department of Defense, 87 F.3d 1356, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 
Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N. Carolina v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 917 F.2d 812, 816 (4th 
Cir. 1990). 
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fields like behavioral economics and lexicography. 
De novo judicial review of USPTO decisions is also necessary to protect 
expressive interests that are embodied in trademark symbols but grounded in 
doctrine outside trademark law, such as the constitutional guarantee of free 
expression. The contrasting USPTO and judicial analysis of “THE SLANTS” 
mark illustrates how trademark registration decisions may change when other 
modes of inquiry, such as First Amendment analysis, are considered in addition 
to trademark law. The dispute arose when Simon Shiao Tam applied to register 
“THE SLANTS” for his electronic music band. The examiner would not 
permit the mark to register on the ground that it violated section 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act, which, before it was held unconstitutional, barred the registration 
of any mark “which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, 
beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”256 The 
TTAB affirmed the examiner’s decision. Tam appealed to the Federal Circuit, 
arguing that the TTAB erred in finding his mark disparaging and that, in any 
event, section 2(a) is unconstitutional.257  
Instead of deferring to the TTAB on its trademark analysis and resting its 
affirmance on trademark law alone, the Federal Circuit met en banc to examine 
how trademark law fits within the larger structure of constitutional law 
governing free speech. Decades earlier, the Federal Circuit held that refusal to 
register a mark did not violate First Amendment rights because the Applicant 
could continue to use the mark.258 In considering “THE SLANTS,” the en 
banc panel reconsidered this precedent and conducted a de novo review of the 
record. After doing so, it concluded that the Lanham Act’s disparagement bar 
is unconstitutional.259 The Supreme Court affirmed and noted that free speech 
issues are often implicated in trademark decisions. It stated that, 
[T]rademarks often have an expressive content. Companies spend 
huge amounts to create and publicize trademarks that convey a 
message. It is true that the necessary brevity of trademarks limits what 
they can say. But powerful messages can sometimes be conveyed in 
just a few words.260 
?  
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 256. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753 (2017). 
 257. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 258. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981), overruled by 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (concluding that “it is clear that the PTO’s refusal to register appellant’s mark does 
not affect his right to use it. No conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is 
suppressed. Consequently, appellant’s First Amendment rights would not be abridged by the 
refusal to register his mark”) (internal citations omitted). 
 259. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1765. 
 260. Id. at 1760. 
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If the Federal Circuit had deferred to the TTAB, it might never have 
reached the constitutional question that led to the invalidation of the 
disparagement clause of section 2(a). Instead, the Federal Circuit recognized 
that significant expressive issues were at stake and chose not to defer to the 
TTAB’s conclusions based only on trademark doctrine.  
Although the speech in Tam has cultural and political connotations not 
shared by all marks, it is not necessarily atypical. Every trademark carries with 
it some expressive value.261 If it did not, it could not function as a distinctive 
source identifier. Trademark professionals work hard to link brands to specific 
ideas.262 Many contemporary marks signify meaningful values that can be used 
to prompt political or cultural change.263   
The USPTO is not empowered to decide questions of constitutional law.264 
After Tam was decided, the USPTO continued to conduct business as usual 
within its sphere of expertise and jurisdiction. It does not have the power to 
apply the reasoning in Tam to invalidate other provisions of the Lanham Act. 
Accordingly, the USPTO continued to treat other provisions of Section 2(a) 
that raise similar constitutional questions as valid. In addition to disparaging 
marks, Section 2(a) indicates that one may not register immoral or scandalous 
marks. The Lanham Act does not define these subjective terms, and as one 
might expect, two empirical studies found that they were routinely applied 
inconsistently.265  
Even after Tam was decided, the USPTO continued to bar registration 
based on the Section 2(a) scandalous and immoral bar. This practice continued 
until the Federal Circuit decided In re Brunetti, in which an applicant sought to 
register “FUCT” for clothing.266 The examiner found that Section 2(a) barred 
the mark’s registration, and the TTAB affirmed, noting that its decision was 
?
 261. See id. at 1752, 1760 (“The foundation of current federal trademark law is the Lanham 
Act, enacted in 1946 . . . By that time, trademark had expanded far beyond phrases that do no 
more than identify a good or service. Then, as now, trademarks often consisted of catchy 
phrases that convey a message.”). 
 262. See NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO 21 (2009) (explaining that in the late twentieth century, 
“a new consensus was born: the products that will flourish in the future will be the one 
presented not as commodities but as concepts: the brand as experience, as lifestyle”). 
 263. See generally Deborah R. Gerhardt, Trademarks as Entrepreneurial Change Agents for Legal 
Reform, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1519 (2017). 
 264. See In re Brunetti, Serial No. 85310960, 2014 WL 3976439, at *5 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 
2014) (“It is abundantly clear that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board is not the appropriate 
forum for re-evaluating . . . First Amendment jurisprudence . . . .”). 
 265. See Meghan M. Carpenter & Mary Garner, NSFW: An Empirical Study of Scandalous 
Trademarks, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 356–61 (2015); Anne Gilson LaLonde & 
Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May Be Scandalous or Immoral, 101 
TRADEMARK REP. 1476, 1478–82 (2011). 
 266. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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founded on trademark law, not constitutional issues:    
It is abundantly clear that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board is 
not the appropriate forum for re-evaluating the impacts of any 
evolving First Amendment jurisprudence within Article III courts 
upon determinations under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, or for 
answering the Constitutional arguments of legal commentators or 
blog critics.267  
Instead of using a deferential rubber stamp, the Federal Circuit reviewed the 
matter de novo and held that based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Tam, 
the Section 2(a) bar against immoral or scandalous marks violated the First 
Amendment.268  
While USPTO expertise may result in a high level of competence with 
respect to trademark law, the specialization of trademark experts and the 
USPTO’s limited jurisdiction are additional reasons not to defer to the 
USPTO. While market and expressive concerns are frequently at issue in 
trademark matters, USPTO examiners and TTAB judges have no special 
expertise in either field. The USPTO policy office is staffed with trademark 
professionals, and not economists, lexicographers, behavioral economists, or 
other business professionals. Examiners and TTAB judges assess trademark 
applications against USPTO TESS data that, by the USPTO’s own admission, 
cannot often be supported by current marketplace evidence. 
VII.? CONCLUSION 
Although there is some confusion as to the level of deference federal 
courts should apply in reviewing USPTO trademark decisions, many are 
correctly applying de novo review. That trend should be solidified as a 
common practice. Too much deference could result in decisions from a 
trademark echo chamber. The USPTO routinely makes registration decisions 
on the fact-intensive questions of availability, validity, and distinctiveness, but 
cannot spend the amount of time that federal courts spend when making 
findings of fact. In determining the appropriate level of deference, federal 
courts should remember that USPTO examiners generally move through 
applications quickly and apply multiple heuristics as a stand-in for evidence of 
market use. The USPTO’s pilot audit of the Principal Register demonstrated 
that half of the audited registrations contained assertions that could not be 
supported with evidence.  
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Because trademarks are dynamic, they change constantly as markets adjust 
to new consumer demands and understandings. Courts should hesitate to 
defer to past trademark decisions, because a trademark decision made based 
on yesterday’s market facts may require reconsideration if the question arises 
in a changed market context. Finally, while the USPTO does have significant 
trademark expertise, its own TTAB judges admit that they make decisions 
within their trademark paradigm and do not view their role as permitting 
review of overlapping doctrinal issues, such as First Amendment protections. 
For all of these reasons, federal judges should apply de novo review of USPTO 
trademark decisions so that, if necessary, they can be fully adjudicated in court 
where market evidence and multiple modes of inquiry can inform the final 
decision. 
